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Aims of the paper
Non-state armed actors can have various negative effects on
long-term development.
One important channel is that, via their competition
against and collaboration with state institutions, they can
weaken the capacity of the state to provide public services,
resolve conflicts and regulate economic activity.
In this paper, we focus on the effects of the Sicilian Mafia
on local state capacity, economic outcomes and politics in
Sicily in the medium and the long run.
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Contributions of the paper
Our paper has two main contributions:
We propose a new hypothesis on the rise of the Sicilian
Mafia at the end of the 19th century, based on the
landowners’ willingness to use the Mafia against the
nascent peasant socialist movement.
Using the drought of 1893 that acted as an important
impetus to the socialist movement, we develop an
identification strategy to estimate the effect of the Mafia on
medium-term state capacity, economic outcomes, and
politics in Sicily. We find large and persistent effect of the
Mafia on these outcomes.
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Results (I)
1 A new hypothesis on the development of the
Sicilian Mafia
The rise of the Mafia in the Sicilian countryside was a response
to the socialist peasants movement starting in 1893.
Following the very severe drought and agrarian crisis in
1893 the socialist movement Fasci dei Lavoratori spread
swiftly among Sicilian peasants.
Given the weakness to counter the socialist threat of the
Italian government at the time, landowners and the
managers of their large estates turned to the Mafia, which
was until then more present in the urban and mining areas.
The Mafia then became endemic in these rural areas with a
long-lasting impact on state capacity.
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Results (II)
2 The presence of the Mafia dramatically decreased
the capacity of the state to provide public goods in
the medium run.
Looking at the level of social and economic outcomes linked to
state capacity we provide evidence of:
a higher infant mortality rate measured in 1908-10;
a lower level of literacy in 1921;
a lower level of industrialization in 1911;
due to the presence of the Mafia.
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Results (III)
3 Mafia presence dramatically decreased the number
of candidates and increased the share of the
winning candidate in contested elections in the
1909 parliamentary elections.
4 Falsification exercises support our identification
strategy:
Outcomes before 1893 are not affected by drought in 1893.
Rainfall in other years does not predict our key outcome or
Mafia variables.
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Related literature (I)
The economics of organized crime
Criminal organizations: The industry of private protection
(Gambetta, 1993; Skaperdas, 2001).
Weak institution, poor law enforcement and lack of trust
provide opportunity for criminal organization to arise.
When the state is unable (or unwilling) to provide
protection and contract enforcement the Mafia can step in.
Empirical investigation on the origins of the Sicilian Mafia:
rich exports (citrus & sulfur) rise the demand for protection
(Bandiera, 2003; Del Monte and Pennacchio, 2012;
Buonanno et al., 2015; Dimico et al., 2012).
recent work on the economic effect of organized crime
(Daniele and Marani, 2011; Pinotti, 2015).
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Related literature (II)
The historical literature on the Sicilian Mafia
For most of 20th century historians linked the origins of
the Mafia to rural Sicily as opposed to the more recent
urban Mafia (Russo, 1964; Romano, 1966; Mack Smith,
1968; CPM, 1977).
But more recent historical work (Lupo, 1996; Dickie, 2004;
Marino, 2004) identifies the origins in the rich,
export-oriented areas of Sicily.
Our work provides a quantitative analysis bridging these
different strands of historical literature.
Our work is also consistent with a recent historical work
(Benigno, 2015) which describes the rise of the Mafia as a
tool of political repression used by political and social elites
in the early years of the Italian unification.
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Data
We assembled a novel dataset on the Sicilian population and
economy, at municipality level:
Use of the land from 1830s and Rural and urban rents from
1850s (Bourbon Cadastre at the end of the feudal era);
Data on the Mafia presence in 1885 and 1900;
Data on the presence of the socialist movement 1891-1894;
Data on rainfall at weather station level from 1881 to 1941
(39 stations);
Data on political elections from 1861 to 1913 at
municipality level;
infant mortality for the years 1869, 1870, 1908, 1909
collected from the death registers of all the Sicilian
municipalities (80,000 death certificates per year);
Literacy rates from 1911-1931 censuses;
Industrialization data from the 1911 industrial census.
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Reliability of data on Mafia presence
Data on Mafia presence is derived from Cutrera(1900):
Police inspector Cutrera analyzes origins, characteristics
and rituals of the Sicilian Mafia;
it also depicted a map of the presence and intensity of the
Mafia for 289 of the 357 Sicilian municipalities;
this is not based on crime records but on his own
knowledge of the phenomenon.
we believe that this is a very reliable source:
The distribution is very similar to what we learned about
Mafia presence from court cases in the late 20th century.;
in De Feo & De Luca (AEJ:EP forth.) we use it as an
instrument for the Mafia presence in late 20th century;
we have an additional measure of the Mafia in 1885 from a
parliamentary enquiry which we use as a control.
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Mafia in 1900 (Cutrera, 1900)
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I Fasci dei Lavoratori
It was the strongest socialist movement in 19th century Italy.
At the first Italian congress of the socialist party in 1893
half of the members were Sicilian;
The first Fasci were formed by industrial workers in the
cities (1891);
Then the crisis in the rural Sicily and the spread of the
socialist movement in the countryside (1893);
The Italian PM Crispi estimated more than 350,000 Fasci
members (10% of Sicilian population).
Their demands:
Increase in wage;
New sharecropping agreements;
Division of latifundia and common land to landless
peasants.
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Peasants Fasci in 1893-4
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Drought and agrarian crisis in 1893
The agrarian crisis in1893:
A very severe drought hit some parts of Sicily especially during
the spring;
Wheat production dropped from 7,750k to 4,365k tons;
Wine, olive oil and citrus production were affected too;
The drought hit an already weak Sicilian agriculture after years
of falling international wheat prices, the commercial war between
Italy and France, and the rise of protectionist policies all over
Europe.
The drought gave rise to a widespread peasants movement:
Peasants unrests were not unusual in Sicily, but generally very
limited in time and space;
The Fasci movement spread on an unprecedented scale in the
Sicilian countryside;
The Fasci were coordinated at regional level by the Socialist
Party with representatives from each province.
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Drought in spring 1893. Ratio of the rainfall in spring 1893 to
long-run average spring rainfall.
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The Fasci, the government, and the Mafia
The Fasci threatened the rural elites:
Several months of peasants’ strikes, with pacific rallies but also
attacks to local authorities, landowners and estate managers.
The central government was unreliable:
The Giolitti government did not adhere to the request by Sicilian
landlords and MPs to send the Army to repress the Fasci;
Eventually the government fell and the Sicilian Crispi became
PM declaring Martial law in Sicily and the Fasci illegal;
Dozens of Fasci members were arrested and sentenced to
hundreds of years in jail, but a new government issued a
collective pardon for the Fasci members in 1896.
Without a reliable government, rural elites turned to the Mafia:
Several documented cases of Mafia armed intervention against
peasants’ rallies (Caltavuturo, Gibellina, Lercara, Giardinello);
Several Fasci leaders killed in the following years.
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Our empirical strategy
Zeroth stage: Pasants’ Fasci determined by drought in
1893.
First stage: Mafia’s presence determined by drought in
1893 [We do also the 2SLS for the effect of peasant fasci on
Mafia, not reported here to save space].
Second stage: state capacity, economic outcomes and
politics as a function of the Mafia instrumented by drought
in 1893.
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Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Main Mafia measure:
Mafia 1900 273 1.432 1.146 0 3
The Fasci movement:
Peasants’ Fasci (1891-94) 333 0.306 0.462 0 1
Socialist Fasci in June 1893 333 0.258 0.438 0 1
Presence of Fasci (1891-94) 333 0.471 0.500 0 1
Main rainfall variable:
relative rainfall spring 1893
(interpolation with a 30km cutoff) 297 0.642 0.280 0.061 1.283
Alternative rainfall variables:
log relative rainfall spring 1893
(interpolation with a 30km cutoff) 297 -0.572 0.559 -2.79 0.249
relative rainfall spring 1893 – censored at 1.00
(interpolation with a 30km cutoff) 297 0 .637 0.273 0.061 1.00
relative rainfall spring 1893
(interpolation with a 30km cutoff, min 2 stations) 195 0.690 0.272 0.061 1.283
relative rainfall spring 1893
(interpolation with a 25km cutoff) 262 0.651 0.293 0.061 1.283
relative rainfall spring 1893
(interpolation with a 35km cutoff) 319 0.637 0.275 0.061 1.283
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Descriptive statistics (cont.)
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Other determinants of Fasci:
rural centre in 1861 333 0.372 0.484 0 1
Rural rent per hectare in 1853 333 6.850 4.746 1.174 35.152
Urban rent per hectare in 1853 333 1.562 4.297 0 69.990
Other determinants of Mafia in 1900:
Sulfur production 1868-70 333 5.591 23.501 0 210
Citrus groves (share in 1830s) 333 0.007 0.015 0 0.160
Mafia in 1885 333 0.565 1.006 0 3
Geographic and demographic controls:
log population in 1861 333 8.371 0.945 5.875 12.190
log area 333 8.194 1.254 4.413 11.191
Altitude of the town centre 333 411.375 276.620 3 1265
Maximum altitude 333 944.159 274.870 48 3274
Average altitude 333 392.140 274.870 10 1627
Distance from Palermo 333 109.021 58.915 0 229
Distance from closest port 333 29.668 16.420 0 108.956
Average temperature 333 15.928 1.543 11 18.45
Long run average rainfall (1881-1941) 307 156.277 29.182 70.146 253.119
Long run variance of relative rainfall (1881-1941) 307 0.213 0.0728 0.118 0.473
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Rainfall data interpolation
For rainfall data we rely on Eredia (1915)
39 private and public weather stations were active in Sicily
at the end of the 19th century;
This is a fairly high number for an area of less than 10k
square miles (1 station every 250 square miles).
As measure of drought we use relative rainfall (e.g., rainfall
in spring 1893 divided by long-run spring average rainfall);
The relative rainfall at municipality level is obtained by
interpolation of the relative rainfall at station level:
The interpolation is the weighted average of the relative
rainfall of all the stations in a 30km radius;
The weights are equal to the inverse distance of the stations
from the municipality centre;
Missing data are reported for the municipalities which don’t
have any station in a 30km radius;
the long run average is computed on the period 1881-1941.
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The impact of drought in 1893 on the development of the Fasci movement.
Dependent variable: Peasant’s Fasci
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rainfall spring 1893 -1.003 -0.763 -0.836 -0.780 -0.753
(interp 30km cutoff) (0.086)*** (0.141)*** (0.136)*** (0.136)*** (0.145)***
Province FE    
Det. Fasci   
Det. Mafia  
Geo/demo controls 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.357 0.390 0.425 0.465 0.474
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Det. Fasci: the dummy for rural centre in 1861, the rural rent per
hectare and the urban rent per hectare.
Det. Mafia: sulfur production in 1868-70, citrus groves (share in 1830s),
and Mafia presence in 1885.
Geo/demo: log population in 1861, log area, altitude of the town centre,
max altitude, ave altitude, dist to Palermo, dist to the
closest port, ave temperature, long-run ave rainfall, long-run
var of relative rainfall.
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Getting the right standard errors
There are two issues we need to tackle to get the right s.e:
The s.e. may show spatial dependence;
The s.e. may be correlated because of the interpolation process
where data available at station level are linearly combined to
obtain the rainfall at municipality level.
In the tables that follow we present the following models in order to
address these concerns:
OLS and GMM models with spatially corrected standard errors
(Conley s.e.);
OLS and 2SLS models with s.e. clustered according to the
closest weather station. Since there are only 31 stations, we use
a wild bootstrap procedure;
OLS and 2SLS models with 2-way clustered s.e. according to the
closest weather station and the district; since there are 31
weather stations and 24 districts we bootstrap along the two
dimensions.
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Getting the right standard errors
Dependent variable: Peasant’s Fasci
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rainfall spring 1893 (interp 30km cutoff) -1.003 -0.763 -0.836 -0.780 -0.753
robust s.e. (0.086)*** (0.141)*** (0.136)*** (0.136)*** (0.145)***
Conley s.e. (0.123)*** (.165)*** (0.174)*** (0.182)*** (0.182)***
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.301)*** (0.269)*** (0.288)*** (0.249)*** (0.241)***
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.136)*** (0.206)*** (0.244)*** (0.261)*** (0.276)***
Province FE    
Det. Fasci   
Det. Mafia  
Geo/demo controls 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.357 0.390 0.425 0.465 0.474
Dependent variable: Mafia 1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
rainfall spring 1893 (interp 30km cutoff) -2.057 -0.661 -0.844 -1.020 -1.094
robust s.e. (0.222)*** (0.339)* (0.324)*** (0.304)*** (0.312)***
Conley s.e. (0.339)*** (0.297)** (0.262)*** (0.247)*** (0.222)***
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.659)*** (0.291)** (0.270)*** (0.326)*** (0.376)***
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.438)*** (0.306)** (0.262)*** (0.290)*** ( 0.392)***
Province FE    
Det. Fasci   
Det. Mafia  
Geo/demo controls 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.255 0.441 0.492 0.543 0.593
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Alternative measures for drought intensity in spring
1893
Dependent variable: Mafia 1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log rainfall spring 1893 (30km) -0.308 -0.362 -0.463
censored rainfall spring 1893 (30km) -0.867 -1.045 -1.124
robust s.e. (0.155)** (0.154)** (0.148)*** (0.341)** (0.320)*** (0.330)***
Conley s.e. (0.138)** (.140)*** (0.122)*** (0.273)*** (0.254)*** (0.233)***
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.122)** (0.135)*** (0.204)** (0.298)*** (0.334)*** (0.359)***
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.168)* (0.184)* (0.202)** (0.289)*** (0.282)*** (0.419)***
Province FE      
Determinants of fasci      
Determinants of Mafia    
Geo/demo controls  
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.485 0.531 0.586 0.492 0.542 0.592
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Different interpolation cutoffs for spring rainfall in 1893
Dependent variable: Mafia 1900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
rain spring 1893 (30km min 2 stn) -1.081 -1.198 -1.318
rain spring 1893 (interp 25km) -0.794 -0.994 -0.945
rain spring 1893 (interp 35km) -0.764 -0.892 -0.931
robust s.e. (0.497)** (0.432)*** (0.389)*** (0.325)** (0.291)*** (0.302)*** (0.326)** (0.314)*** (0.332)***
Conley s.e. (0.394)*** (0.360)*** (0.274)*** (0.379)** (0.317)*** (0.245)*** (0.278)*** (0.257)*** (0.258)***
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.425)** (0.429)*** (0.391)*** (0.465)* (0.446)** (0.347)*** (0.245)*** (0.268)*** (0.279)***
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.327)*** (0.284)*** (0.374)*** (0.573) (0.454)** (0.460)** (0.316)** (0.278)*** (0.352)***
Province FE         
Det. Fasci         
Det. Mafia      
Geo/demo controls   
Observations 155 155 155 216 216 216 263 263 263
R-squared 0.558 0.631 0.677 0.478 0.536 0.592 0.480 0.521 0.568
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Falsification test
IV estimation of the effect of the Mafia on pre-1893 outcomes.
Dep. variable: Infant mortality Winning share in 1865 No. of candidates receiving
in 1869-1870 parliamentary elections votes in 1865
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mafia 1900 0.005 0.007 0.003 -0.095 -0.082 -0.045 0.430 0.383 0.258
robust s.e. (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.082) (0.064) (0.061) (0.230)* (0.178)** (0.174)
Conley s.e. (0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.085) (0.062) (0.056) (0.246)* (0.188)** (0.181)
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.111) (0.084) (0.089) (0.347) (0.277) (0.298)
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.110) (0.078) (0.092) (0.307) (0.262) (0.351)
Province FE         
Det Fasci         
Det Mafia      
Geo/demo controls   
1st stage excluded instrument:
rainfall spring 1893 (30km)         
Observations 217 217 217 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 0.106 0.114 0.181 -0.024 0.042 0.157 -0.153 -0.059 0.198
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Falsification tests for years 1900-1941
We run falsification tests with 42 years of rainfall to check that
rainfall correlation is significant only for 1893 and random for
other years.
Dependent variable: Mafia 1900
% signif. neg at 10% % signif. pos at 10%
Drought variable:
rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.01 0.03
log rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.01 0.02
censored rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.02 0.04
Notes: We report the % of a positive and negative coefficients for the drought variable (built for years 1900-
1941) with a p-value< 0.1 when we test the three main specifications of the model with 2-way clustered
and bootstrapped standard errors on closest station and district.
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The effect of the Mafia on state capacity:
Infant mortality rate
2SLS estimation of the effect of Mafia 1900 on infant mortality
in 1908-9.
Dep. variable: Infant mortality in 1908-09
(1) (2) (3)
Mafia1900 0.059 0.052 0.052
robust s.e. (0.027)** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
Conley s.e. (0.019)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)***
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.026)** (0.022)** (0.021)**
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.026)** (0.020)*** (0.023)**
Province FE   
Det Fasci   
Det Mafia  
Geo/demo controls 
1st stage excluded instrument:
rainfall spring 1893 (30km)   
Observations 239 239 239
R-squared -0.843 -0.541 -0.463
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The effect of the Mafia on state capacity:
Literacy rates in 1911-1921
2SLS estimation of the effect of Mafia 1900 on literacy rates for
the population above 6 in 1911 and 1921 (stock variables,
slower change).
Dep var: Literacy in 1911 in 1921
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1900 -0.060 -0.048 -0.051 -0.093 -0.075 -0.075
robust s.e. (0.040) (0.031) (0.030)* (0.047)** (0.034)** (0.033)**
Conley s.e. (0.034)* (0.028)* (0.032) (0.042)** (0.033)** (0.033)**
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.035)* (0.029) (0.031) (0.041)** (0.035)** (0.034)**
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.049) (0.043) (0.054) (0.047)** (0.041)* (0.044)*
Province FE      
Det Fasci      
Det Mafia    
Geo/demo controls  
1st stage excluded instrument:
rainfall spring 1893 (30km)      
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
R-squared 0.018 0.139 0.161 -0.485 -0.175 -0.098
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Industrial development in 1911
2SLS estimation of the effect of the Mafia on industrialization
in 1911. The dependant variable is a dummy that takes value 1
for the municipalities with a share of manufacturing workers on
population above the average.
Dep var: Industrial development in 1911
(1) (2) (3)
Mafia1900 -0.426 -0.366 -0.406
robust s.e. (0.260) (0.198)* (0.192)**
Conley s.e. (0.204)** (0.167)** (0.161)**
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.201)** (0.174)** (0.191)**
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.213)** (0.188)* (0.206)*
Province FE   
Det Fasci   
Det Mafia  
Geo/demo controls 
1st stage excluded instrument:
rainfall spring 1893 (30km)   
Observations 245 245 245
R-squared -0.392 -0.238 -0.239
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Mafia and politics
How did the Mafia affect state capacity?
The influence of the Sicilian Mafia on politics represents a
major channel for the effect on state capacity;
One of the possible measures is related to the level of
political competition;
We can show that the Sicilian Mafia had a sizeable
negative effect on the level of political competition;
We use data on parliamentary election in 1909;
It was a FPTP system with 54 electoral district in Sicily.
We look at the share of the most voted candidate and the
number of candidates in each municipality;
Earlier we showed the falsification exercise for the
parliamentary elections in 1865.
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Winning share in parliamentary elections
2SLS estimation of the effect of the Mafia on the share of the
most voted candidate in each municipality and the number of
candidates in the 1909 parliamentary elections.
ep. variable: Winning share in 1909 No. of candidates
parliamentary elections in 1909
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia1900 0.345 0.284 0.237 -0.826 -0.694 -0.584
robust s.e. (0.147)** (0.100)*** (0.081)*** (0.401)** (0.286)** (0.248)**
Conley s.e. (0.118)*** (0.088)*** (0.072)*** (0.366)** (0.277)** (0.257)**
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.115)*** (0.111)** (0.076)*** (0.387)** (0.339)** (0.272)**
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.149)** (0.128)** (0.114)** (0.384)** (0.340)** (0.319)*
Province FE      
Det Fasci      
Det Mafia    
Geo/demo controls  
1st stage excluded instrument:
rainfall spring 1893 (30km)      
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242
R-squared -1.839 -0.960 -0.486 -0.870 -0.442 -0.153
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Falsification tests for social, economic and political outcomes
We run further falsification tests using rainfall for all the
years 1900-1941;
We first run the reduced form regressions of rainfall in 1893
on social economic and political outcomes (not reported);
And then we use the data for the years 1900-1941 to check
that the rainfall is significant only for the 1893, and
random for all the other years.
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Falsification tests for social, economic and political outcomes
Dependent variable: Inf. mort. in 1908-9 Industr. develop. in 1911
% signif. % signif. % signif. % signif.
neg at 10% pos at 10% neg at 10% pos at 10%
Drought variable:
rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02
log rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.02 0.095 0.03 0.02
censored rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02
Dependent variable: Literacy rate in 1911 Literacy rate in 1921
% signif. % signif. % signif. % signif.
neg at 10% pos at 10% neg at 10% pos at 10%
Drought variable:
rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00
log rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.095 0.01 0.095 0.01
censored rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.01
Dependent variable: Winning share in 1909 No. of candidates in 1909
% signif. % signif. % signif. % signif.
neg at 10% pos at 10% neg at 10% pos at 10%
Drought variable:
rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.01
log rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.00
censored rainfall spring 19XX (30km) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03
Notes: We report the % of a positive and negative coefficients for the drought variable (built for years 1900-
1941) with a p-value< 0.1 when we test the three main specifications of the model with 2-way clustered and
bootstrapped standard errors on closest station and district.
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Further robustness checks
1 In order to tackle the problems introduced by interpolated
data, we also have a ML estimation which uses the full
weighting matrix of the interpolation to correct the
standard errors (not reported).
2 Controlling for socialist (and peasants’) organizations:
In the first part, drought in 1893 is an instrument for the
peasants’ movement which triggers the expansion of the
Mafia;
In the second part drought in 1893 is directly used an
instrument for the Mafia;
The exclusion restriction is satisfied only if drought in 1893
has no other direct or indirect effect on the outcomes;
A potential problem may arise if the socialist peasants’
movement is still active in those municipalities and can
affect the the capacity of the state;
In what follows we show that this is not the case.
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Persistence of the socialist (peasants’) movement
Here we show that the socialist (peasants’) movement presence
in 1908/1913 is not correlated to the drought in 1893 (the
coefficient is not significant and has the opposite sign)
Dep. variable: Socialist vote share in 1913 Peasants’ Leagues in 1908
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rainfall spring 1893 (30km) 0.282 0.280 0.180 0.002 0.002 0.005
robust s.e. (0.088)*** (0.090)*** (0.086)** (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Conley s.e. (0.131)** (0.132)** (0.111) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.219) (0.228) (0.196) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.234) (0.238) (0.222) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Province FE      
Det Fasci      
Det Mafia    
Geo/demo controls  
Observations 292 292 292 297 297 297
R-squared 0.161 0.173 0.364 0.097 0.104 0.171
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first dependant variable is the vote share for candidates belonging
the two socialist parties in the parliamentary elections in 1913, which was the first one with universal manhood
suffrage. The second dependant variable is the membership rate of peasants’ leagues in 1908.
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Controlling for the strength of the socialist movement in
the early 20th century
The negative effect on state capacity and political competition
is due to the Mafia and not to the socialist movement.
Dep. variable: Infant Industrial Winning No of
mortality Literacy rate in Developm. share candidates
1908-9 1911 1921 in 1911 in 1909 in 1909
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia 1900 0.047 -0.046 -0.062 -0.343 0.211 -0.537
robust s.e. (0.019)** (0.030) (0.030)** (0.175)* (0.071)*** (0.207)***
Conley s.e. (0.014)*** (0.028) (0.028)** (0.163)** (0.064)*** (0.236)**
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.020)** (0.029) (0.030)** (0.199)* (0.063)*** (0.247)**
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.024)** (0.052) (0.035)* (0.207)* (0.094)** (0.307)*
Socialist vote share in 1913 -0.018 0.036 0.083 0.368 -0.181 0.372
robust s.e. (0.019) (0.032) (0.032)** (0.186)** (0.075)** (0.217)*
Conley s.e. (0.019) (0.038) (0.039)** (0.208)* (0.067) (0.224)*
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.021) (0.032) (0.037)** (0.207)* (0.095)* (0.225)
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.016) (0.043) (0.041)** (0.235) (0.100)* (0.200)*
Province FE      
Det Fasci      
Det Mafia      
Geo/demo controls      
Observations 238 244 244 244 241 241
R-squared -0.356 0.190 0.049 -0.121 -0.298 -0.077
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Controlling for the strength of the socialist movement in
the early 20th century
This is confirmed if we use an alternative measure based on the
membership of peasants’ leagues.
Dep. variable: Infant Industrial Winning No of
mortality Literacy rate in Developm. share candidates
1908-9 1911 1921 in 1911 in 1909 in 1909
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mafia 1900 0.052 -0.051 -0.075 -0.404 0.237 -0.583
robust s.e. (0.021)** (0.033) (0.035)** (0.195)** (0.0816)*** (0.229)**
Conley s.e. (0.016)*** (0.032) (0.033)** (0.160)** (0.072)*** (0.256)**
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.021)** (0.031) (0.034)** (0.188)** (0.076)*** (0.273)**
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.024)** (0.052) (0.045)* (0.223)* (0.108)** (0.341)*
Peasants’ leagues membership on pop 1908 0.106 0.040 0.072 -0.931 -0.281 0.918
robust s.e. (0.110) (0.187) (0.198) (3.714) (0.455) (1.280)
Conley s.e. (0.064) (0.116) (0.146) (1.788) (0.414) (1.170)
clust + wildboot on closest stn (0.055)* (0.132) (0.088) (1.748) (0.216) (0.833)
clust + boot on closest stn+district (0.0724) (0.191) (0.119) (2.288) (0.463) (1.786)
Province FE      
Det Fasci      
Det Mafia      
Geo/demo controls      
Observations 239 245 245 245 242 242
R-squared -0.467 0.161 -0.096 0.113 -0.482 -0.149
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Conclusion
We develop and empirical substantiate a new hypothesis on
the development of the Mafia in Sicily: it expanded in the
rural areas of Sicily to suppress the socialist movement
started in 1893;
The temporary rainfall shock had long term consequences
on the distribution of the Sicilian Mafia.
Based on this identification strategy we show the negative
effect of the Mafia on state capacity by looking at the effect
on infant mortality, literacy rates, and industrial
development.
We also discuss the effect of the Mafia presence on the
political competition which substantially decreased in the
areas where the Mafia expanded.
The latter represents one of the possible mechanisms
through which the presence of the Mafia affected state
capacity in Sicily.
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